In this paper, we analyze the legal situation regarding physician-assisted suicide in the world. Our hypothesis is that the prohibitive stance on physician-assisted suicide in most societies in the world today seems to be related to our moral attitudes toward suicide. This brings us to a discussion about life itself. We claim that the total lack of legal protection for physician-assisted suicide from international organizations and most countries in the world lies in a philosophical assumption that supports much of our (...) common beliefs about what life really is. This assumption states that life must be thought of as not belonging exclusively to the individual. We argue that this assumption is a misconception that can be heard in the debate on suicide. Consequently we endorse a different conception of life which tends to favor a pro-choice stance towards suicide and assisted death in general. This position takes the patient’s decision about when to die more seriously. We conclude that there is no reason why physician-assisted suicide does not deserve legal protection as an individual right to die under international law. (shrink)

This paper criticizes the thesis of the neutrality of moral values of artifacts, and makes the case for a proposal known as Value Sensitive Design, which states that moral values must be considered in the construction and analysis of artifacts. First, (1) we will present the best defense of the thesis of the neutrality of moral values of artifacts, made by Joseph Pitt. In the following, (2) we will criticize each of the arguments presented by Pitt in favor of the (...) neutrality thesis. Finally, (3) we will consider the Value Sensitive Design proposal presented by Ibo van de Poel and Peter Kroes and explain how it would be suitable for a critique of the values and moral issues that artifacts can represent. (shrink)

Neste artigo, pretendo desafiar duas teses que compõem a interpretação padrão da teoria de justiça social de Hume. Primeiro, que esse entendimento não oferece recursos conceituais sufi cientes para se esboçar uma teoria de justiça distributiva e, segundo, que essa teoria é, em princípio, indiferente a ocasionais arranjos sociais fortemente desiguais. Contrariamente, proponho aqui um esboço para uma possível teoria de justiça distributiva em Hume. Argumento, com base em evidência textual, que Hume aborda sistematicamente questões como a distribuição inicial, mudanças (...) na ordem distributiva e, finalmente, ocasionais arranjos redistributivos à luz de princípios que combinam associações imaginativas, considerações de interesse público e intuições utilitaristas. (shrink)